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Abstract
This paper investigates social inﬂuences on attitudes to risk and oﬀers an evo-
lutionary explanation of risk-taking by young low-ranked males. Becker, Murphy
and Werning (2005) found that individuals about to participate in a status tour-
nament may take fair gambles even though they are risk averse in both wealth
and status. Here their model is generalised by use of the insight of Hopkins and
Kornienko (2010) that in a tournament or status competition one can consider
equality in terms of the status or rewards available as well as in initial endow-
ments. While Becker et al. found that risk-taking is increasing in the equality of
initial endowments, it is found here that it is increasing in the inequality of re-
wards in the tournament. Further, it is shown that the poorest will be risk loving
if the lowest level of status awarded is suﬃciently low. Thus, the disadvantaged
in society rationally engage in risky behavior when social rewards are suﬃciently
unequal. Finally, as greater inequality in terms of social status induces gambling,
it can cause greater inequality of wealth.
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1 Introduction
Many people undertake highly risky activities. They engage in crime, go to war, par-
ticipate in extreme sports, take drugs or start ﬁghts. To an evolutionary psychologist,
the fact that young men are disproportionately represented in such activities is not a
coincidence. Young men take risks in order to achieve social reputation or status which
may improve mating success (Wilson and Daly, 1985). Such competition is more intense
amongst men than women, as men face a greater variance in reproductive outcomes.
To an economist, such behaviour is diﬃcult to integrate into a tradition where decision
makers are typically taken to be risk averse. Further, to my knowledge, economics has
little to say about why risk attitudes should depend on either gender or age. If any-
thing, the lower wealth of the young compared to older adults would be expected to
make them relatively risk averse.
A second question is the relation between risk-taking behaviour and inequality.
Clearly, the traditional economic view of risk preferences being subjective and idiosyn-
cratic says little of how such behaviour should vary with the wealth of others. Yet, there
is evidence that such risk-taking behaviour is more common in more unequal societies.
Crime has been found to be increasing in inequality by Kelly (2000) and Fajnzylber
et al. (2002), among others. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) ﬁnd a positive relationship
between inequality and a wider range of risky behaviours. To explain their empiri-
cal ﬁndings, they argue that violence and other forms of risk taking are provoked by
unfavourable social comparisons, and inequality increases such “evaluation anxiety”.
The problem is that existing formal models of social rivalry ﬁnd results that seem to
run in the opposite direction. Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) ﬁnd in a model of status
that competition decreases not increases with inequality. Becker, Murphy and Werning
(2005) analyse a similar model but concentrate on the implications for risk taking. They
ﬁnd that such behaviour will only take place when the initial distribution of wealth is
suﬃciently equal. That is, there is more risk-taking behaviour in more equal societies.
Further, gambling will be done at intermediate levels of wealth, so that the middle class
should be the most risk-taking.
In this paper, I show how a simple change of perspective can provide very diﬀerent
results. A large population of individuals choose how much of their initial endowments
to allocate to competition in a tournament. Performance in the tournament determines
how a range of ranked rewards or status positions are allocated. The great insight of
Becker et al. (2005) is that the anticipation of taking part in such a competition for
status may induce individuals to take fair gambles, even though their underlying pref-
erences over consumption and status are concave. This is integrated into the framework
of Hopkins and Kornienko (2010) which permits consideration of equality in terms of
the status or rewards available as well as in terms of initial endowments. For example,
the diﬀerence in return to occupying high versus low social position can and does vary
across societies. Here, I ﬁnd that risk-taking behaviour is increasing in inequality of
ﬁnal rewards, even if it is decreasing in the inequality of initial endowments.
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Speciﬁcally, I ﬁnd that if the value of the minimum status or reward approaches
zero, the lowest-ranked in society will be risk-loving. This result holds even if the low-
est rank have substantial wealth. Thus, in this model, it is the prospect of low status,
independent of the aﬄuence of society, that determines risk taking. Further, an increase
in inequality of rewards will make low-ranked agents more risk loving. All agents after
the tournament, in “old age”, will be risk averse. Thus, this model implies, when com-
bined with the observation from evolutionary psychology that men face more dispersed
rewards than women, that risk-taking behaviour will be most common amongst young,
low-ranked men, and that this behaviour will be more common in more socially unequal
societies.
The basic intuition for these results is that social exclusion leads to desperation.
More speciﬁcally, an individual who has an endowment that is low relatively to his
rivals can expect only a low reward from participating in the tournament, even if his
wealth is high in absolute terms. Further, if this reward is suﬃciently low, the marginal
value of doing better in the tournament can be arbitrarily high. For example, if low
status means that marriage and children are unlikely to be attainable, then evolution-
ary considerations suggest that an individual in that situation should be desperate to
change this outcome. This gives an incentive to gamble. In contrast, in a society that
guarantees a relatively high minimum level of status, there would be less appetite for
risky behaviour among the low-ranked.
Robson (1992) was the ﬁrst to integrate relative concerns into risk preferences (see
also Robson, 1996; Harbaugh and Kornienko, 2000; Hvide, 2002; Ray and Robson,
2011; Robson and Samuelson, 2010). The important diﬀerence in Robson (1992) is that
there individual utility is directly assumed to be convex in relative wealth. This could
be plausible in that it means that the diﬀerence between being ﬁrst and second is more
important than the diﬀerence between tenth and eleventh. However, here I explore an
alternative idea. It is not the underlying preferences for high position that cause ﬁerce
competition for status. Rather it is the large objective diﬀerence in rewards to high and
low position that is what is important. For example, a top tennis tournament typically
has prize money that is highly convex in the ranking achieved, which will induce highly
competitive behaviour by tennis professionals even though they may have utility that is
concave in wealth. A further diﬀerence is that in Robson (1992) and Ray and Robson
(2011) Becker et al. (2005) more gambling happens in more equal societies and it is
more likely that those who gamble will have intermediate levels of wealth rather than
being poor.
Becker et al. (2005) and Ray and Robson (2011) draw an important further conclu-
sion from their analysis: there is an upper bound on the level of equality that can be
supported in society. If the level of equality exceeds it, then some agents would have
an incentive to gamble leading to a wider distribution of wealth.1 In this paper, I ﬁnd
1Ray and Robson (2011) extend the analysis of concern for relative wealth to a dynamic setting
and thereby endogenise the distribution of wealth. They ﬁnd that in steady state there is persistent
gambling.
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that the maximum level of equality in wealth is increasing in the equality of status. In
fact, an arbitrarily equal distribution of wealth can be supported without gambling, if
status is suﬃciently equally distributed. Equally, an increase in the inequality of status
can induce gambling. So, status inequality can create inequality in wealth.
Thus, this model provides an explicit theoretical mechanism which would support
the apparent empirical relationship between inequality and risk-taking behaviour. But
the causation ﬂows in a diﬀerent way than is normally assumed. If a society is relatively
egalitarian in its treatment of its citizens, so that advantages of being rich beyond higher
consumption are relatively minor, then individuals have little incentive to gamble and
the wealth distribution will remain undispersed. However, where social advantage leads
to highly diﬀerential mating opportunities, such as in polygamous societies, or where
there is signiﬁcant diﬀerences in treatment between the social classes, then this provides
a strong incentive for the low ranked to take on risks. This in turn leads to a relatively
dispersed distribution of wealth. Thus, unequal social arrangements can cause economic
inequality.
2 A Status Tournament
The model is similar to that found in Frank (1985), Hopkins and Kornienko (2004,
2010) and Becker, Murphy and Werning (BMW) (2005). A large population of agents
compete in a tournament with a range of ranked rewards that could represent either
material outcomes, such as cash prizes, or non-material awards of status. Agents make
a strategic decision over how to allocate their endowment between performance in the
tournament and private consumption. As BMW ﬁrst discovered, this situation can
lead to individuals being willing to take fair gambles if they are oﬀered before the
tournament. This is because the utility function implied by equilibrium behaviour in
the tournament can be convex in initial endowments, even though an individual has
preferences that are concave in both consumption and rewards. The model is solved
backwards. This section analyses the tournament stage of the game. The next section
looks at the implied incentives to take gambles prior to the tournament. Stable wealth
distributions that in eﬀect clear the market for gambling in that they give no incentive
to gamble, are characterised in Section 4.
I assume a continuum of agents. Each has a diﬀerent endowment of wealth 푧 with
endowments being allocated according to the publicly known distribution 퐺(푧) on [푧, 푧¯]
with 푧 > 0. The distribution 퐺(푧) is twice diﬀerentiable with strictly positive density
푔(푧). The level of each contestant’s endowment is her private information.
Next, and before the tournament, individuals may have an incentive to gamble with
their wealth. It is assumed that a range of fair gambles are oﬀered each in the form
of a continuous density over a bounded interval. As Ray and Robson (2011) suggest,
these gambles could be lotteries in the common meaning of the term or, more generally,
entry into risky occupations or making risky investments. Then, one would expect that
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gambles are taken until the market clears in the sense that the distribution of wealth is
such that no-one wishes to gamble further. It is shown in Section 4 that such “stable”
wealth distributions exist.
For now, I consider the tournament taking place with the initial wealth distribution
퐺(푧). If 퐺(푧) is not itself stable, we would expect, by the time the tournament actually
takes place, that gambling will have changed the wealth distribution to a stable distri-
bution. However, the point is that it is the anticipation of taking part in a tournament
when the distribution of wealth is not stable which gives the incentive to take risks. It
is thus necessary to model the hypothetical possibility, of playing the tournament under
the initial non-stable wealth distribution, in order to understand risk attitudes.
In the tournament itself, agents make a simultaneous decision on how to divide their
wealth 푧 between performance 푥 and consumption 푐, with 푥+ 푐 = 푧. Performance has
no intrinsic utility, but rewards 푠 are awarded on the basis of performance, with the
best performer receiving the highest reward, and in general, one’s rank in performance
determining the rank of one’s reward. A speciﬁc interpretation in BMW and Hopkins
and Kornienko (2004) is that 푥 represents expenditure on conspicuous consumption,
and 푠 is the resulting status. An alternative, ﬁrst due to Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite
(1992), is that 푠 represents the quality of a marriage partner achieved. Relating this
to evolutionary considerations, the range of rewards in a society which permits a high
degree of polygyny would be wider than in a society in which strict monogamy is
enforced. What is important here is that there is a schedule of rewards or status
positions available, which are assigned by performance, but are otherwise exogenous
with respect to wealth.
In any case, it is assumed that all individuals have the same preferences over con-
sumption 푐 and status or rewards 푠,
푈(푐, 푠) (1)
where 푈 is a strictly increasing, strictly concave, three times diﬀerentiable function
with 푈푐, 푈푠 > 0, and 푈푐푐, 푈푠푠 < 0. So, agents are risk averse with respect to both
consumption and status. I also assume that 푈푐푠 ≥ 0, so that the case of additive
separability 푈푐푠 = 0 and status and consumption being positive complements 푈푐푠 > 0
are both included. As BMW stress, it is when 푈푐푠 > 0, strict complementarity between
rewards and consumption, that the results on risk taking are strongest.
The order of moves is, therefore, the following:
1. Agents receive their endowments 푧.
2. Agents are oﬀered fair gambles which they are free to accept or to reject.
3. Agents commit a part 푥 of their wealth 푧 to performance in the tournament.
4. Each agent receives a reward 푠, the value of which is determined by performance
in the tournament.
4
5. Agents consume their remaining endowment 푐 = 푧−푥 and their reward 푠, receiving
utility 푈(푐, 푠).
To this point, the model is identical to that of BMW (and very similar to that
of Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004). However, here I follow Hopkins and Kornienko
(2010) in assuming that the rewards or status positions of value 푠 whose publicly known
distribution has an arbitrary twice diﬀerentiable distribution function 퐻(푠) on [푠, 푠¯],
with 푠 > 0, and strictly positive density ℎ(푠). BMW assume that 퐻(푠) is ﬁxed as a
uniform distribution on [0,1]. As they point out, for the existence of equilibrium, this
represents a harmless normalisation. However, this clearly prevents the major exercise
here: identifying the change of behaviour arising from changes in the distribution of
rewards.
Rewards or status are assigned assortatively according to rank in performance, with
the highest performer receiving the highest reward and the lowest performer the lowest
reward. Let 퐹 (푥) be the distribution of choices of performance. One’s position in this
distribution will determine the award achieved. Precisely, an individual who chooses a
performance level 푥 will receive a reward
푆(푥, 퐹 (⋅)) = 퐻−1 (휃퐹 (푥) + (1− 휃)퐹−(푥)) (2)
where and 퐹−(푥) = lim휉↑푥 퐹 (휉) and for some 휃 ∈ (0, 1). The role of the parameter
휃 is to break potential ties that would occur if a mass of agents were to choose the
same level of performance. For example, if all agents chose the same performance, this
assumption would be consistent with rewards being randomly assigned.2 However, if
all contestants choose according to a continuous strictly increasing strategy 푥(푧), then,
ﬁrst, 퐹 (푥) = 퐹−(푥) for all 푥, and, second, 퐹 (푥(푧)) = 퐺(푧).3 Together, this implies,
퐻(푠) = 퐹 (푥) = 퐺(푧), one holds the same rank in wealth, performance and in reward
achieved, or
푆(푥, 퐹 (푥)) = 퐻−1(퐹 (푥)) = 퐻−1(퐺(푧)) = 푆(푧). (3)
We can call 푆(푧) the reward or status function, as in a monotone equilibrium, it repre-
sents the relationship between initial endowment and the reward or status achieved.
Importantly, the reduced form equilibrium utility given a monotone equilibrium
performance function 푥(푧) will then be
푈(푧) = 푈(푧 − 푥(푧), 푆(푧)). (4)
We will see that this function 푈(푧) can be convex, even given our concavity assumptions
on 푈(푐, 푠). Therefore, agents would accept a fair gamble over their endowment, if such
a gamble was oﬀered before the tournament.
2Note that 퐹 (푥) and 퐹−(푥) are only distinct when a positive mass of agents choose the same
performance 푥. For a fuller discussion, see Hopkins and Kornienko (2004).
3The probability that an individual 푖 is placed higher than a randomly selected individual 푗 is
퐹 (푥푖(푧푖)) = Pr[푥푖(푧푖) > 푥푗(푧푗)] = Pr[푥
−1
푗 (푥푖(푧푖)) > 푧푗 ] = 퐺(푥
−1
푗 (푥푖(푧푖))) = 퐺(푧푖).
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If all agents follow a monotone strategy 푥(푧), then an individual with endowment 푧
should choose 푥(푧). If she considers deviating to a diﬀerent level of performance 푥(푧ˆ),
she will have no incentive to do so if
−푥′(푧ˆ)푈푐(푧 − 푥(푧ˆ), 푆(푧ˆ)) + 푆 ′(푧ˆ)푈푠(푧 − 푥(푧ˆ), 푆(푧ˆ)) = 0. (5)
Setting 푥(푧ˆ) = 푥(푧) and rearranging, we have
푥′(푧) =
푈푠(푧 − 푥(푧), 푆(푧))푆 ′(푧)
푈푐(푧 − 푥(푧), 푆(푧)) . (6)
The solution to the above diﬀerential equation with boundary condition,
푥(푧) = 0 (7)
will be our equilibrium strategy. This is shown in the next result, which is a slight
generalisation of similar results in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) and BMW (2005).
One important step in the proof (in the Appendix) is to show that despite the possibility
of the equilibrium utility function 푈(푧) being convex, individual utility is pseudoconcave
in performance 푥 so that the ﬁrst order condition (5) above does represent a maximum.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique solution 푥(푧) to diﬀerential equation (6) with
boundary condition (7). This is the unique symmetric equilibrium to the tournament.
Having established the framework of the tournament, the next step is to proceed
in solving backwards. The next section considers the risk attitudes of agents who are
about to participate in the tournament.
3 Implied Risk Attitudes
The main focus of this paper is to examine the risk attitudes implied by participation
in the status tournament. As described in the previous section, an individual with
wealth 푧 will anticipate equilibrium utility 푈(푧) = 푈(푧 − 푥(푧), 푆(푧)), where 푥(푧) is the
equilibrium choice of performance and 푆(푧) = 퐻−1(퐺(푧)) is the reward function. If
this function is convex for some range of wealth, then individuals with wealth on that
range would take fair bets if such bets were oﬀered to them prior to the tournament.
The analysis in this section focuses on the question as to when in fact this function will
be convex.
We have by the envelope theorem 푈 ′(푧) = 푈푐(푧 − 푥(푧), 푆(푧)) and
푈 ′′(푧) = 푈푐푐(푧 − 푥(푧), 푆(푧))(1− 푥′(푧)) + 푈푐푠(푧 − 푥(푧), 푆(푧))푆 ′(푧). (8)
By inspection one can immediately see that 푈 ′′(푧) will be positive, even though 푈푐푐 < 0,
if either 푥′(푧) or 푆 ′(푧) is suﬃciently large. Note that 푆 ′(푧) = 푔(푧)/ℎ(푆(푧)). Thus,
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BMW’s result that equality in endowments would lead agents to be willing to accept
lotteries follows quite directly. If the distribution of endowments 퐺(푧) is strongly uni-
modal, then its density 푔(푧) will have a very high value at and around its mode.
One could also decompose the expression (8) into (suppressing arguments)
푈 ′′(푧) = 푈푐푐 + ( 푈푐푠푆 ′(푧)− 푥′(푧)푈푐푐 )
which separates the negative and positive elements but also the traditional and non-
traditional parts. The ﬁrst part 푈푐푐 is negative and reﬂects risk aversion towards regular
consumption. The second, in brackets, gives the competitive part which is positive.
The problem in obtaining an unambiguous result is that both factors can become larger
in absolute terms when wealth or status is low. With low wealth (and hence low 푐)
traditionally one would be risk averse.
Nonetheless, one can ﬁnd a suﬃcient condition for low status individuals to be risk
loving. It is a condition on the marginal value of status such that low status leads to
desperation.
Deﬁnition 1. Devil Take the Hindmost4 (DTTH) condition: lim푠→0 푈푠(푐, 푠) = ∞ for
any 푐 > 0 and 푈푐(푐, 푠) is bounded above for 푐 > 0.
For example, suppose 푈 = log 푐+log 푠, then 푈푠 = 1/푠 so that as 푠 tends to 0 then 푈푠
tends to inﬁnity. In general, since 푈푠푠 < 0 by assumption, as the lowest reward or level
of status 푠 decreases, it pushes its marginal value 푈푠 higher. The DTTH assumption
is simply that 푈푠 is not bounded above. Thus, when the consequences of being last
are suﬃciently unattractive (for example, being seized by the devil), the value to the
last-placed individual of moving up the ﬁeld is arbitrarily high.
I now show that given the DTTH condition, the poorest individuals in any society
must be risk loving if their status is suﬃciently low. This is independent of the minimum
level of wealth 푧. That is, even in rich societies, the lowest ranked people can be risk
loving. In the developed world, the poor may have consumption levels that are high by
historic standards, but what this result shows is that if relative status is low, they still
may be risk-taking.
The result is stated for the individual with the lowest possible status 푠, but by
continuity of the utility function, if the lowest ranked individual is risk loving, so will
be an interval of others with higher wealth (see also Example 1 below).
Proposition 2. Assume the DTTH condition, ﬁx the distribution of wealth with 푧 > 0,
and consider a distribution of rewards such that 푆 ′(푠) > 0 and 푠 > 0. Then, there is an
푠∗ > 0 such that if the minimum reward level 푠 is less than 푠∗ then the poorest individual
will be risk loving. That is, 푈 ′′(푧) > 0.
4On the origin of this phrase: “It is said when a class of students have made a certain progress in
their mystic studies, they are obliged to run through a subterranean hall, and the last man is seized
by the devil” (Brewer (2001)).
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Note that the eﬀect of taking the minimum level of wealth to zero will have the
opposite eﬀect. For simplicity, suppose there is additive separability so that 푈푐푠 = 0.
Then, if 푈푐 becomes large as 푧 goes to zero, 푥
′ will go to zero, and 푈 ′′ will be negative.
So low wealth leads to risk aversion. It is low status that leads to risk taking.
3.1 Eﬀects of an Increase in the Dispersion of Rewards
Let us now move to a principal question in this paper, the relationship between risk
attitudes and inequality in rewards. Speciﬁcally, it is possible to show that making
rewards more unequal leads to more risk taking behaviour. To do this, I will compare
two distributions of rewards 퐻푎(푠) and 퐻푝(푠), 푎 for ex ante and 푝 for ex post. I suppose
that the distribution of rewards changes from 퐻푎(푠) to 퐻푝(푠) for exogenous reasons. I
then see how this aﬀects risk attitudes.
To carry out this analysis, some notion of a distribution being more dispersed than
another is needed. I use a strong version of the dispersive order. Speciﬁcally, I say that
a distribution 퐻푝 is strictly larger in the dispersive order than a distribution 퐻푎, or
퐻푝 >푑 퐻푎 if
ℎ푝(퐻
−1
푝 (푟)) < ℎ푎(퐻
−1
푎 (푟)) for all 푟 ∈ [0, 1]. (9)
The original deﬁnition of this stochastic order (Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007, pp148-
9) has the same condition but with a weak inequality, and on (0,1). A simple example of
distributions satisfying this stronger condition would be any two uniform distributions
where one distribution has support on a strictly longer interval than the other (see
Hopkins and Kornienko (2010) for further examples and discussion).
Lemma 1. Suppose that the distribution of rewards becomes strictly more dispersed in
terms of the dispersive order 퐻푝 >푑 퐻푎 and that the lowest reward 푠 is unchanged then
the poor become more risk loving. That is, 푈 ′′푝 (푧) > 푈
′′
푎 (푧).
While one might think that a general increase in the dispersion of rewards would
lead to a general increase in risk-taking, this may not be the case. This is because an
increase in the dispersion of rewards makes the tournament more competitive, which
will tend to raise performance and lower consumption. For example, Hopkins and
Kornienko (2010) ﬁnd simple suﬃcient conditions for all agents to increase performance
and reduce consumption in response to more dispersed rewards. This matters as, other
factors being equal, lower consumption typically increases risk aversion. The poor will
nonetheless become more risk loving, as the consumption of the poorest is tied down
by the boundary condition (7) which is unchanged.
A further result is that reducing the minimum reward level will increase risk-taking
by the poorest in society.
Lemma 2. Consider two distributions of rewards 퐻푎(푠) and 퐻푝(푠) which diﬀer in terms
of minimum status such that 푠푎 > 푠푝, but ℎ푝(푠푝) = ℎ푎(푠푎). Either (a) assume additive
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Figure 1: Illustration of Proposition 3: ex post status 푆푝 is more dispersed than ex ante
푆푎 leading to the slope of the equilibrium utility function becoming convex at low levels
of wealth. Typically, ex post utility 푈푝 is lower and ex post performance 푥푝 is higher.
separability so that 푈푐푠 = 0; or (b) assume the DTTH condition and that 푈푐푠푠, 푈푐푐푠 ≤ 0
and that 푈 ′′푎 (푧) ≤ 0. Then, 푈 ′′푝 (푧) > 푈 ′′푎 (푧).
Putting these two results together, it is possible to obtain the following result:
greater inequality of rewards causes the poor to be more risk-taking. This case would
include a form of mean preserving spread on rewards. For example, two uniform dis-
tributions having the same mean but with one 퐻푝 having a wider support would be
suitable.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the distribution of rewards becomes strictly more dispersed
in terms of the dispersive order 퐻푝 >푑 퐻푎, and the minimum reward decreases 푠푝 ≤ 푠푎.
Either (a) assume additive separability so that 푈푐푠 = 0; or (b) assume the DTTH
condition and that 푈푐푠푠, 푈푐푐푠 ≤ 0 and that 푈 ′′푎 (푧) ≤ 0. Then the poor become more risk
loving. That is, 푈 ′′푝 (푧) > 푈
′′
푎 (푧).
See Figure 1 for an illustration of this result. It also gives typical results on how
performance and the level of utility responds to the greater level of competition implied
by greater inequality of rewards. While there are no such results in this paper, Hopkins
and Kornienko (2010) already have shown that greater dispersion of rewards lead to
an increase in performance and a decrease in utility for most, and sometimes for all,
individuals. See also Example 1 below.
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3.2 Eﬀects of an Increase in the Dispersion of Wealth
BMW argue that increase in the dispersion of wealth, such as produced by gambling
over wealth, should reduce the desire to gamble. The basic thrust of their claims are
supported in new results given below. However, the relationship between inequality of
wealth and lower risk taking is not straightforward. For example, it is possible to show
that certain mean preserving spreads in wealth will make the poorest less, not more,
risk averse.
For this, I use second order stochastic dominance. Speciﬁcally, let us say a distri-
bution 퐹 is more dispersed than a distribution 퐺 in terms of second order stochastic
dominance with single crossing, and we write 퐹 >푠푐 퐺 if they have the same mean and∫ 푧
푧
퐹 (푡)−퐺(푡) 푑푡 > 0 (10)
for 푧 ∈ (푧, 푧¯) and are single crossing. That is, 퐹 (푧) > 퐺(푧) on (푧, 푧ˆ) and 퐹 (푧) < 퐺(푧)
on (푧ˆ, 푧¯) for some 푧ˆ ∈ (푧, 푧¯). This represents a reﬁnement of the standard deﬁnition of
second order stochastic dominance (see, for example, Wolfstetter, 1999, pp. 140-4), in
which the inequality (10) hold weakly and there is no single crossing condition.
I now consider changes in the distribution of wealth, assuming that the distribution
changes from some distribution 퐺푎(푧) ex ante, to another distribution 퐺푝(푧) ex post.
One can think about this change occurring for two diﬀerent reasons. First, there could
be some exogenous change. Second, the distribution of wealth could become more
dispersed due to the gambling activity by individuals. But whatever the reason for the
change, we will see how this aﬀects individual risk attitudes.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the distribution of wealth becomes more dispersed in terms
of second order stochastic dominance with single crossing 퐺푝 >푠푐 퐺푎, and minimum
wealth 푧 is unchanged. Then the poor become less risk averse. That is, 푈 ′′푝 (푧) > 푈
′′
푎 (푧).
The above result is based on the assumption that the dispersion of wealth rises
without the support of the distribution widening. So, the density of people rises at
the top and bottom ends of the distribution. In general, as found by Hopkins and
Kornienko (2004), a higher density means greater competitiveness, and here the higher
density of poor people leads to a higher willingness to undertake risky behaviour.5
In contrast, to increase risk aversion at low incomes, it is necessary to disperse
wealth over a greater range, and in particular to make the poorest poorer. Even then,
to ensure that risk-taking decreases, one needs to impose strong conditions, such as
requiring that the ratio 푈푐푐/푈푐푠 is increasing in 푐.
6 Nonetheless, the ﬁnal result in
5To be fair, similar problems would have arisen in the earlier analysis of the eﬀect of greater
inequality in rewards, if reward inequality had been increased on an unchanging support. The point is
that one should be quite careful about what one means by greater inequality.
6This last condition holds for Cobb-Douglas and CES utility functions.
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this section establishes, as BMW supposed, that greater dispersion of wealth can lower
individuals’ willingness to gamble.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the distribution of wealth becomes strictly more dispersed
in terms of the dispersive order 퐺푝 >푑 퐺푎, and minimum wealth decreases 푧푝 ≤ 푧푎.
Assume that 푈푐푐푐 ≥ 0 and 푈 ′′푎 (푧푎) ≤ 0 and assume either (a) that there is additive
separability so that 푈푐푠 = 0; or (b) that 푈푐푐푠 ≤ 0 and 푈푐푐/푈푐푠 is increasing in 푐. Then
the poor become more risk averse. That is, 푈 ′′푝 (푧푝) < 푈
′′
푎 (푧푎).
3.3 Cobb-Douglas
In this section, for concreteness we look at Cobb-Douglas preferences, for which closed
form solutions for equilibrium behaviour and preferences are possible. Suppose
푈(푐, 푠) = 푐훼푠훽 = (푧 − 푥)훼푠훽 (11)
Let 훾 = 훽/훼. Then,
푥′(푧) = 훾
푆 ′(푧)
푆(푧)
(푧 − 푥) (12)
with again 푥(푧) = 0. This diﬀerential equation has the explicit solution
푥(푧) = 푧 −
푠훾푧 +
∫ 푧
푧
푆훾(푡)푑푡
푆훾(푧)
, 푐(푧) =
푠훾푧 +
∫ 푧
푧
푆훾(푡)푑푡
푆훾(푧)
.
Thus
푈(푧) =
(
푠훾푧 +
∫ 푧
푧
푆훾(푡)푑푡
)훼
(13)
and
푈 ′(푧) = 훼푆훾(푧)(푠훾푧 +
∫ 푧
푧
푆훾(푡)푑푡)훼−1 = 훼푐훼−1(푧)푆훽(푧)
and
푈 ′′(푧) = 훼(훼− 1)푐훼−2(푧)푆훽(푧)(1− 푥′(푧)) + 훼훽푐훼−1(푧)푆훽−1(푧)푆 ′(푧).
With Cobb-Douglas preferences, the expression for absolute risk aversion is partic-
ularly neat,
퐴푅(푧) = −푈
′′(푧)
푈 ′(푧)
= −훾푆
′(푧)
푆(푧)
+
1− 훼
푐(푧)
(14)
where again 훾 = 훽/훼. That is, changes in the ratio 푆 ′(푧)/푆(푧) clearly change risk
preferences (though 푐(푧) will also change). But we could also deﬁne a form of relative
risk aversion as 퐴푅(푧)푐(푧) which would give us
푅푅(푧) = −푐(푧)푈
′′(푧)
푈 ′(푧)
= −훾푐(푧)푆
′(푧)
푆(푧)
+ (1− 훼) = −푥′(푧) + (1− 훼) (15)
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Example 1. Suppose rewards are uniform on [휀, 1− 휀] and wealth is uniform on [1, 5]
and 훼 = 훽 so that 훾 = 1. We have then
푆(푧) = 휀+
1− 2휀
4
(푧 − 1)
and
푈(푧) =
(
휀+
∫ 푧
1
휀+
1− 2휀
4
(푡− 1)푑푡
)훼
=
(
(푧 − 1)2 + 2휀(−1 + 6푧 − 푧2)
8
)훼
Take, for example, 훼 = 0.4. With a relatively equal distribution of rewards/status 푆푎,
for example with 휀 = 0.25, all agents are risk averse. However, let us make rewards
more unequal, 휀 = .1, label this new status function 푆푝. Then, 푈푝(푧) is convex on
[1,2.44) and is concave on (2.44, 5]. See Figure 1. That is, take an individual with
an endowment of about 2.5, then that individual will be risk loving with respect to
losses and risk averse with respect to gains. Note that ex post equilibrium utility 푈푝(푧)
is everywhere lower than ex ante 푈푎(푧) and ex post equilibrium performance 푥푝(푧) is
everywhere higher (푥푎 = (푧− 1)/2 and 푥푝 = (푧2− 1)/(2푧− 1)). We can also verify that
more dispersed wealth makes agents more risk averse. Keeping rewards dispersed with
휀 = 0.1 but making wealth also more dispersed, so for example wealth is now uniform
on [0.5, 5.5], utility will return to being concave at all wealth levels.
4 The Inﬂuence of the Distribution of Rewards on
Stable Wealth Distributions
We have seen that anticipated participation in a status tournament can give individuals
an incentive to take gambles. BMW, following Robson (1992), consider distributions
of wealth that in contrast are stable in the sense that given such a distribution, no
agent wishes to gamble and therefore the distribution of wealth does not change. Sta-
ble distributions can also be seen as clearing the market for gambling. If the initial
wealth distribution was not stable, then there would be an incentive to gamble until
the redistribution of wealth resulting from gambling made it stable.
Following Robson (1992) and BMW (2005), the exact process by which the market
for gambling is cleared is not modelled. For example, there is no strategic analysis
of the agents’ simultaneous choice of gambles. Rather, simply the existence of stable
distributions is shown. However, even if there are no available lotteries or the process
of gambling does not converge to a stable distribution, this is not a problem for the
main focus of the paper, which concerns the analysis of when is there an incentive to
gamble, as covered in Section 3. Somewhat more problematic would be the possibility
of gambling resulting in a discontinuous distribution of wealth. It is thus assumed that
there is a complete set of fair gambles available in the form of continuous densities on
bounded intervals, bankruptcy is not allowed so that minimum wealth 푧 remains strictly
positive, and that the resulting distribution of wealth is stable and diﬀerentiable.
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Note that there will potentially be many wealth distributions that are stable. Thus,
BMW focus on the stable wealth distribution (which they call the ∗ allocation) that
induces risk neutrality at all levels of wealth.7 The idea is that distributions that are
less dispersed than the stable distribution will induce gambling (indeed, see Proposition
5 in the previous section). Thus, this stable distribution represents an upper bound on
sustainable equality of wealth. So, let us call it the most equal stable distribution or
MESD.
In this section, there are the following novel results. First, I prove the uniqueness
of the MESD (in the class of diﬀerentiable distributions). Second, I show that greater
inequality in rewards implies that the MESD becomes more unequal. Third, a result
that follows directly from the second, the maximum level of equality is as high as the
degree of equality in status. Societies that oﬀer a high degree of equality of esteem can
support very equal distributions of wealth.
Further, suppose we take the MESD as a prediction of the actual distribution of
wealth in society. Then our second result implies that societies that are socially more
unequal result in more unequal wealth outcomes. For example, consider two societies
that have the same initial distribution of wealth that is quite equal. The ﬁrst society
is relatively socially egalitarian with the status assigned to the poorest individual rela-
tively high so that there is no incentive to gamble and the initial distribution of wealth
is unchanged. However, the second society treats its citizens more unequally with a
low minimum status. This we have seen can induce gambling, which will result in a
greater dispersion of wealth. Thus, more unequal social conditions can produce wealth
inequality.
I now solve for the MESD, which is deﬁned as the wealth distribution that induces
risk neutrality at all levels of wealth. If we set the expression for 푈 ′′(푧) in (8) to zero,
this leads to the following diﬀerential equation (suppressing arguments)
푆 ′(푧) =
푈푐푈푐푐
푈푠푈푐푐 − 푈푐푈푐푠 (16)
with boundary condition
푆(푧) = 푠. (17)
Of course, by assuming that 푆(푧) is diﬀerentiable, this procedure limits the search for
stable distributions to wealth distributions that are smooth and continuous. Using this
diﬀerential equation (16) and the diﬀerential equation (6) for equilibrium performance,
one can write a new diﬀerential equation for equilibrium consumption,
푐′(푧) =
푈푐푈푐푠
푈푐푈푐푠 − 푈푠푈푐푐 . (18)
Given the boundary condition (7) for equilibrium performance, the boundary condition
for the above equation will be 푐(푧) = 푧. A solution of the two equations simultaneously
7They show that marginal utility having a constant value 휆, or 푈 ′(푧) = 푈푐(푐(푧), 푆(푧)) = 휆 in
current notation, is also a solution to the problem of a utilitarian social planner.
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will provide the MESD. Speciﬁcally, the MESD 퐺∗(푧) is deﬁned as 퐺∗(푧) = 퐻(푆∗(푧)),
where 푆∗(푧) is the solution to the equation (16).
Further, it is possible to prove the MESD is unique, for a given distribution of
rewards and for a given mean wealth. This can be interpreted as that given an ini-
tial unstable wealth distribution with average wealth 휇, there is exactly one wealth
distribution that exactly clears the market for fair gambles.
Proposition 6. For a given distribution of rewards 퐻(푠), there is a unique solution
(푐∗(푧), 푆∗(푧)) to the simultaneous diﬀerential equation system (16) and (18) with bound-
ary conditions 푐(푧) = 푧 and 푆(푧) = 푠, such that 푈(푧) = 푈(푐∗(푧), 푆∗(푧)) is linear
in 푧 for all 푧 ∈ [푧, 푧¯]. Thus, 푈 ′′(푧) = 0 at all wealth levels. Further, assume that
푈푐푐푐 ≥ 0, 푈푐푐푠 ≤ 0 and 푈푐푐/푈푐푠 is increasing in 푐, then for ﬁxed mean wealth 휇 there is
a unique distribution of wealth 퐺∗(푧) such that 퐻−1(퐺∗(푧)) = 푆∗(푧).
From this proposition, one can draw the following comparative statics result. The
MESD moves with the distribution of rewards. If rewards become more (less) equal, the
minimum level of wealth inequality falls (rises) in the sense of second order stochastic
dominance with single crossing, a concept introduced in the previous section.
In what follows, it is assumed that there are ex ante and ex post distributions of
rewards, 퐻푎(푠) and 퐻푝(푠) respectively. Under each distribution of rewards, we calculate
푆∗푖 (푧) for 푖 = 푎, 푝, the associated reward function that induces risk neutrality at all
wealth levels. Further, by the previous result, Proposition 6, this will also deﬁne 퐺∗푎(푧)
and 퐺∗푝(푧) the ex ante and ex post most equal stable distributions of wealth. I ﬁnd that
a greater dispersion in rewards necessitates a greater dispersion in wealth in order to
maintain risk neutrality. An example of this is illustrated in Figure 2.
Proposition 7. Assume the ex post distribution of rewards 퐻푝 is more dispersed than
the ex ante distribution 퐻푎 in terms of the dispersive order, 퐻푝 >푑 퐻푎, that the min-
imum reward falls or 푠푝 < 푠푎, that the maximum reward rises 푠¯푝 > 푠¯푎 and the mean
reward is unchanged. Assume further that 푈푐푠푠, 푈푐푐푠 ≤ 0, 푈푐푐푐 ≥ 0 and 푈푐푐/푈푐푠 is in-
creasing in 푐. Then, the ex post MESD wealth distribution is more dispersed in terms of
second order stochastic dominance with single crossing than ex ante. That is, 퐺∗푝 >푠푐 퐺
∗
푎.
This has an important corollary. If we consider a sequence of distributions of rewards
each progressively more equal than the previous, then the corresponding distributions
of wealth would also become progressively more equal.
Corollary 1. As the distribution of rewards approaches perfect equality, so does the
Most Equal Stable Distribution of wealth.
Despite the earlier results of BMW and Ray and Robson (2011), it is thus possible
to sustain an equal society, even in the presence of status competition, provided there
is an equality in terms of esteem.
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Figure 2: Illustration of Proposition 7: ex post rewards 푆푝 are more dispersed than ex
ante 푆푎. To maintain risk neutrality, ex post wealth 퐺푝 must be more dispersed than ex
ante 퐺푎, with ex post minimum wealth 푧푝 being lower and maximum wealth 푧¯푝 being
higher than ex ante.
4.1 Cobb-Douglas
Assume Cobb-Douglas preferences 푈(푐, 푠) = 푐훼푠훽, then the diﬀerential equation (16)
becomes
푆 ′(푧) =
훼(1− 훼)푆(푧)
훽푐(푧)
and (18) becomes
푐′(푧) = 훼.
This implies that performance and consumption are linear in wealth, speciﬁcally 푥(푧) =
(1− 훼)(푧 − 푧) and 푐(푧) = 훼푧 + (1− 훼)푧. This in turn can be used to solve for 푆∗(푧):
푆∗(푧) = 퐴[푐(푧)](1−훼)/훽 = 퐴(훼푧 + (1− 훼)푧)(1−훼)/훽,
where 퐴 is a constant of integration. One can check that this implies 푈(푧) = 퐴훽푐(푧)
which is linear as required. Of course, for strict concavity of the Cobb-Douglas utility
function, one needs 훼 + 훽 < 1, so that 푆∗(푧) is therefore convex. Thus, as 퐺∗(푧), the
MESD, is equal to 퐻(푆∗(푧)), this minimum inequality wealth distribution will be more
convex than the distribution of rewards.
Example 2. Assume that rewards are distributed uniformly on [휀, 1 − 휀]. Assume
further that 훼 = 훽 = 1/2 (of course, this means that the utility function is not strictly
concave, but as we will see it makes everything conveniently linear). Then, given mean
wealth of 1/2, the unique distribution 퐺∗(푧) that solves for 푆∗ is
퐺∗(푧) =
(1− 휀)푧 − 휀/2
1− 2휀 .
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That is, it is uniform on [휀/(2(1− 휀)), (2− 3휀)/(2(1− 휀))]. We have
푆∗(푧) = (1− 휀)푧 + 휀/2, 푈∗(푧) = 휀/2 + (1− 휀)푧√
2(1− 휀) .
Clearly, a decrease in 휀 makes the distribution of rewards more dispersed. It will also
make the equilibrium distribution of wealth퐺∗(푧) more dispersed. Equally, a more equal
distribution of rewards, implies a more equal stable distribution of wealth. Indeed, as
휀 approaches 1/2, then both the distribution of rewards and the distribution of wealth
become entirely concentrated at 1/2.
5 Discussion: Risk-Taking, Gender and Age
It is possible to link the formal results of this paper to some quite simple conclusions
about risk taking by age and by gender. It follows quite directly that risk taking can
be expected to be greater by young low-ranking males.
First, after the tournament, in “old age”, all agents will be risk averse. In the
ﬁnal stage, after rewards have been assigned, an agent will have a reward 푠 and will
have her endowment less 푥, the amount spent on the tournament. She will have utility
푈(푧 − 푥, 푠) if she goes ahead and consumes the remaining endowment and the reward.
If oﬀered a fair gamble over either, she will refuse as 푈 is concave in both arguments
by assumption. That is, gambling only occurs when young.
Second, from Proposition 3, one can see that a population facing a greater dispersion
in rewards will have greater risk-taking by those with low endowments. So, if men as
a population have more dispersed rewards than women, low-ranking men will be more
risk-taking than low-ranking women.
It is well-recognised that, in an evolutionary sense, men’s rewards are more variable
than women’s. As Wilson and Daly (1985, p60) write, “male ﬁtness variance exceeds
female ﬁtness variance”. This is because, while female fertility is limited by physiological
constraints, male fertility can be much higher if access to multiple mates is possible.
Wilson and Daly argue that therefore the eﬀective degree of polygyny - the extent to
which a single male can have multiple exclusive partners - determines the level of social
competition amongst males and the “more intense this competition, the more we can
expect males to be inclined to risky tactics” (p. 60).8 That is, the current model
provides formal support for Wilson and Daly’s argument.
This paper does not make any claims with respect to welfare, for example, whether
risk-taking behaviour should be encouraged or discouraged. There are two reasons.
First, there are already results in this direction. Hopkins and Kornienko (2010) show in
8It has been suggested that the greater variability of male reproductive success is also the cause of
greater male variability in a number of traits. That is, randomization by males can also be physiological.
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a more general model that greater equality in rewards can make most and possibly all
individuals better oﬀ. Ray and Robson (2011) similarly show that a completely equal
outcome where gambling is banned is Pareto superior to their equilibrium steady state.
Second, the current model is too abstract to be much use in policy prescription. In par-
ticular, they do not distinguish between an incentive to undertake risky activities such
as crime, that carry negative externalities, and those that carry positive externalities,
such as entrepreneurship.
The previous study closest to the current work is Robson (1996). He considers a
model where men care about relative wealth because of the possibility of polygyny:
high relative wealth means that a man can attract multiple partners. This gives men
an incentive to gamble. He shows that in some cases the only stable wealth distribution
is where one man has all the wealth. The eﬀective diﬀerence here is that by varying
the reward schedule, the rate at which relative wealth can be converted into marriage
opportunities is altered. Thus, the incentive to gamble can itself be varied.
The idea that low ranked agents may have an incentive to gamble has an apparent
similarity to the idea of “gambling for resurrection”, in which agents who are near to
bankruptcy have an incentive to gamble because any downside losses would be trun-
cated. See, for example, Gollier et al. (1997). However, none of the results in this paper
depend on any such mechanism. Here agents will take fair bets, even though they will
have to suﬀer the downside in full. Clearly, if limited liability were a possibility, then
the incentive to gamble would be increased.
An evolutionary approach also suggests how the ﬁndings in this paper - risk-taking
by the poor is increasing in inequality of status, but decreasing in the inequality of
wealth - might be distinguished empirically. The current model speciﬁes a distribution
of rewards or status outcomes that is exogenous and independent of the distribution
of wealth. Marriage arrangements are one example of how rewards could vary in this
way. Some societies explicitly allow polygamy, others condone polygyny while others
are strictly monogamous. Thus, the evolutionary return to high status would be quite
diﬀerent across these diﬀerent societies. Further, while the underlying causation for
these diﬀering customs may be economic, such institutions change slowly and most
individuals would plausibly take them as ﬁxed. Indeed, broadly consistent with the
hypotheses advanced here, existing cross-cultural studies (Bacon et al., 1963; Barber,
2000) ﬁnd that polygamy is associated with higher levels of violent crime. More recently,
Wei and Zhang (2011) ﬁnd that more risk-taking behaviour is to be found in provinces
in China where the male-female gender ratio is high and thus marriage opportunities
for males are more ﬁercely competed.
Thus, the apparent empirical relationship between economic inequality and risk-
taking behaviour might be misleading. Rather, as in the model presented here, it is
unequal social relationships that can cause risk-taking behaviour. Inequality in wealth
then follows as a result, as social inequality provides individuals with an incentive to
gamble over wealth. This is a fascinating possibility which merits further empirical
investigation.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: This proof follows that of Proposition 1 of Hopkins and
Kornienko (2004). A sketch is as follows. Given 푈푐푠 ≥ 0, best replies are (weakly)
increasing in 푧. Given the tie breaking rule (2), a symmetric equilibrium strategy must
in fact be strictly increasing. If the equilibrium strategy is strictly increasing then it
can be shown to be continuous and, furthermore, diﬀerentiable. Thus, it satisﬁes the
diﬀerential equation (6). This has a unique solution by the fundamental theorem of
diﬀerential equations.
The ﬁrst order condition (5) is a maximum, as if all others adopt the proposed
equilibrium strategy utility is pseudoconcave in 푥 for each individual. That is, 푈(푧 −
푥,퐻−1(퐹 (푥))) is increasing in 푥 for 푥 less than the equilibrium choice 푥(푧) and is
decreasing in 푥 for 푥 greater than 푥(푧). That is, utility 푈(푧 − 푥,퐻−1(퐹 (푥))) is pseu-
doconcave in performance 푥. To show this, if all agents adopt a strictly increasing
strategy 푥(푧) then an individual’s utility can be written as 푈(푧 − 푥,퐻−1(퐹 (푥))) and
∂푈/∂푥 = −푈푐(푧 − 푥,퐻−1(퐹 (푥))) + 푈푠(푧 − 푥,퐻−1(퐹 (푥)))푓(푥)/ℎ(⋅). Then, one has
∂2푈/∂푥∂푧 = −푈푐푐 + 푈푐푠푓(푥)/ℎ(⋅) > 0. Take 푥˘ < 푥(푧) and let 푧˘ be such that
푥(푧˘) = 푥˘, so that 푧˘ < 푧. Hence, for any 푥˘ < 푥(푧), 푑푈(푧 − 푥˘, 퐻−1(퐹 (푥˘)))/푑푥 ≥
푑푈(푧˘ − 푥˘, 퐻−1(퐹 (푥˘)))/푑푥 = 0. Thus, utility is increasing in 푥 for 푥 below the equi-
librium choice 푥(푧). A similar argument can establish that it is decreasing in 푥 for 푥
above 푥(푧).
The boundary condition (7) must hold as the agent with lowest wealth 푧 in a sym-
metric equilibrium has status 푆(푧) = 푠 and thus chooses performance 푥 to maximise
푈(푧 − 푥, 푠). Clearly, the optimal choice of performance for the agent with wealth 푧 is
zero.
Proof of Proposition 2: One has from (7) that 푐(푧) = 푧, so that from (8) it follows
that
푈 ′′(푧) = 푈푐푐(푧, 푠)(1− 푥′(푧)) + 푈푐푠(푧, 푠)푆 ′(푧) (19)
and from (6) that
푥′(푧) =
푈푠(푧, 푠)푆
′(푧)
푈푐(푧, 푠)
. (20)
It can be calculated that
∂푥′(푧)
∂푠
=
푈푠푠푈푐 − 푈푐푠푈푠
푈2푐
푆 ′(푧) < 0.
But this implies that 푥′(푧) is monotone in 푠. Further, applying the DTTH condition,
one obtains lim푠→0 푥′(푧) = ∞ (note that as 푈푐푠 ≥ 0 then 푈푐(푧, 푠) will not increase as
푠 decreases). Putting these together, there is clearly an 푠0 > 0 such that 푥
′(푧) = 1
for 푠 = 푠0. Therefore, given the continuity of 푈
′′(푧), there exists 푠∗ such that 푈 ′′(푧) is
strictly positive for 푠 < 푠∗ where 푠∗ ≥ 푠0 > 0 (with 푠∗ = 푠0 only if 푈푐푠 = 0).
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Proof of Lemma 1: The second derivative of the utility function risk aversion for
the poorest agent is 푈 ′′푖 (푧) = 푈푐푐(푧, 푠)(1 − 푥′(푧)) + 푈푐푠(푧, 푠)푆 ′푖(푧) for 푖 = 푎, 푝. That
is, as 푐(푧) = 푧 and 푆(푧) = 푠 under both distributions, the only way that 푈 ′′(푧) can
diﬀer is in terms of 푆 ′ and 푥′. The dispersive order by its deﬁnition (9) implies that
ℎ푝(퐻
−1
푝 (푟)) < ℎ푎(퐻
−1
푎 (푟)) for 푟 ∈ [0, 1]. Now, 푆 ′(푧) = 푔(푧)/ℎ(푆(푧)) = 푔(푧)/ℎ(퐻−1(푟)).
Thus, given 푔(푧) is unchanged, the dispersive order implies that 푆 ′푝(푧) > 푆
′
푎(푧) for all
푧 ∈ [푧, 푧¯]. It is easy to verify that an increase in 푆 ′(푧) will also increase 푥′(푧) as given
in (20). The result follows.
Proof of Lemma 2: (a) Under additive separability, the second derivative of the
utility function for the poorest agent becomes 푈 ′′(푧) = (1 − 푥′(푧))푈푐푐(푧). It is easy to
verify that a decrease in 푠 will increase 푥′(푧) as given in (20), but given separability will
not aﬀect 푈푐 or 푈푐푐. The result follows.
(b) When there is not additive separability, one has
∂푈 ′′(푧)
∂푠
= 푈푐푐푠(1− 푥′(푧)) + 푈푐푠푠푆 ′(푧)− ∂푥
′(푧)
∂푠
푈푐푐,
which, given our assumptions, is certainly negative where 푥′(푧) < 1. In the proof of
Proposition 2 it was shown that 푥′(푧) is monotone in 푠. Thus, as noted, there must be
a value 푠0 such that if 푠 = 푠0 then 푥
′(푧) = 1. If, as assumed, 푠푎 is such that 푈
′′
푎 (푧) ≤ 0,
then 푠푎 > 푠0. If also 푠푝 > 푠0, then it follows that 푈
′′
푝 (푧) > 푈
′′
푎 (푧), as 푈
′′(푧) is monotone
in 푠 on (푠0, 푠푎). If 푠푝 ≤ 푠0, then 푈 ′′푝 (푧) > 0 ≥ 푈 ′′푎 (푧) and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3: This follows directly from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 4: As wealth and status of the poorest agent is unchanged, the
only eﬀect on 푈 ′′(푧) as given in (19) is from a change in the density 푆 ′(푧) = 푔(푧)/ℎ(푠).
Now, as second order stochastic dominance by deﬁnition requires
∫ 푧
푧
퐺푝(푡)−퐺푎(푡)푑푡 > 0
on (푧, 푧¯), we have (generically) 푔푝(푧) > 푔푎(푧) and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 5: We again consider 푈 ′′(푧) as given in (19). From (20) it can
be calculated that
∂푥′(푧)
∂푧
=
푈푠푐푈푐 − 푈푐푐푈푠
푈2푐
푆 ′(푧) > 0,
and
∂푈 ′′(푧)
∂푧
= 푈푐푐푐(1− 푥′(푧)) + 푈푐푐푠푆 ′(푧)− ∂푥
′(푧)
∂푧
푈푐푐. (21)
(a) Given additive separability, if 푈 ′′(푧) ≤ 0 then 푥′ ≤ 1. It follows that the derivative
(21) is strictly positive. Thus, the decrease in minimum wealth considered by itself
leads to greater risk aversion for the poorest. Further, by the dispersive order we have
푔푝(푧푝) = 푔푝(퐺
−1
푝 (0)) < 푔푎(퐺
−1
푎 (0)) and so 푆
′
푝(푧) = 푔푝(푧푝)/ℎ(푠) < 푔푎(푧푝)/ℎ(푠) = 푆
′
푎(푧)
and thus the greater dispersion also increases risk aversion, and the result follows.
(b) If 푈 ′′(푧) ≤ 0 then 푥′(푧) < 1 and 푆 ′(푧) ≤ −(1− 푥′(푧))푈푐푐/푈푐푠. Thus, the derivative
(21) satisﬁes
∂푈 ′′(푧)
∂푧
≥ (1− 푥′(푧))(푈푐푐푐 − 푈푐푐푠푈푐푐
푈푐푠
)− ∂푥
′(푧)
∂푧
푈푐푐.
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If 푈푐푐/푈푐푠 is increasing, then 푈푐푐푐 − 푈푐푐푠푈푐푐/푈푐푠 ≥ 0 and the derivative (21) is positive.
The result then follows as in part (a).
Proof of Proposition 6: By the deﬁnition of the diﬀerential equation (16), the
solution (푐∗(푧), 푆∗(푧)) implies that 푈 ′′(푐∗(푧), 푆∗(푧)) = 0. Thus, 푈(푧) is linear as
푈 ′(푧) = 푈푐 > 0. Such a solution must exist by the fundamental theorem of diﬀerential
equations because both (16) and (18) are continuously diﬀerentiable and bounded. The
solution is unique for a given initial condition, that is, for a given minimum wealth level
푧. That is, there is a family of distributions ⟨퐺푖⟩ that each satisfy 퐻−1(퐺푖(푧)) = 푆∗(푧),
each corresponding to a diﬀerent level of minimum wealth 푧푛. Finally, I prove that in
this family, average wealth 휇 is strictly increasing in 푧.
The equation system (푐′, 푆 ′) as deﬁned by (16) and (18) is autonomous, that is a
function of 푐 and 푆 alone and only a function of 푧 through 푐 and 푆. It thus follows
by fundamental theory of diﬀerential equations, that two solution curves (푐(푧), 푆(푧))
cannot cross on the (푐, 푆) plane. So, given two solutions with initial conditions (푧푖, 푠)
and (푧푗, 푠) for some 푧푖 < 푧푗, it follows that 푐푗 > 푐푖 for any given value of 푆. Now
consider the two associated solutions for rewards, 푆푖(푧) and 푆푗(푧) on the (푧, 푆) plane.
I claim there is no value of 푧 such that 푆푖(푧) = 푆푗(푧). Suppose not, then because
푆푖(푧푖) = 푆푗(푧푗) = 푠 and 푧푗 > 푧푖, at the ﬁrst such crossing 푆푗 must cross 푆푖 from below.
But as
∂푆 ′(푐, 푠)
∂푐
=
−푈푐푈푐푠푈2푐푐 + 푈3푐푐푈푠 − 푈2푐 (푈푐푐푐푈푐푠 − 푈푐푐푈푐푐푠)
(푈푠푈푐푐 − 푈푐푈푐푠)2 < 0
(this follows from the assumptions on 푈푐푐푐, 푈푐푐푠 and 푈푐푐/푈푐푠) and as 푐푗 > 푐푖, we have
푆 ′푖 > 푆
′
푗 at such a point of crossing. Thus, such a crossing is not possible and so, given
distinct initial values of endowments 푧푗 > 푧푖, it must hold that 푆푖(푧) < 푆푗(푧) for all
푧. Hence, for a ﬁxed 퐻(푠), we have 퐺푗(푧) = 퐻
−1(푆푗(푧)) < 퐻−1(푆푖(푧)) = 퐺푖(푧). That
is, 퐺푗(푧) stochastically dominates 퐺푖(푧) and 휇푗 > 휇푖. This implies, that for any given
level of average wealth 휇, there exists a unique 푧 such that the mean of 퐺∗(푧) is 휇.
Proof of Proposition 7: By the dispersive order we have ℎ푝(퐻
−1
푝 (푟)) < ℎ푎(퐻
−1
푎 (푟)).
Together with our other assumptions on minimum and maximum rewards, it implies
that 퐻푝(푠) and 퐻푝(푠) are single crossing, with a unique reward 푠ˆ such that 퐻푝(푠ˆ) =
퐻푎(푠ˆ).
Let us assume that 푧푝 < 푧푎, the minimum wealth level is lower under the new
distribution (this later will be shown to hold). Given that solutions (푐(푧), 푆(푧)) to the
diﬀerential equation system cannot cross on the (푐, 푆) plane, given our initial conditions
푐푎(푧푎) = 푧푎, 푆푎(푧푎) = 푠푎 and 푐푝(푧푝) = 푧푝, 푆푝(푧푝) = 푠푝 respectively, we have 푐푝 < 푐푎
for a given level of 푆. Turning to solutions 푆푎(푧) and 푆푝(푧) graphed as a function of 푧
alone, points of crossing of 푆푎(푧) and 푆푝(푧) are possible. However, because 푐푎 > 푐푝 and
∂푆 ′(푐, 푠)/∂푐 < 0 (as shown in the proof to the previous proposition), then 푆 ′푝(푧) > 푆
′
푎(푧)
at any such crossing. Thus, there is at most one crossing where 푆푎(푧) = 푆푝(푧). There
must be a crossing as otherwise clearly the mean reward could not be the same in both
cases. Hence there is a unique crossing at endowment 푧ˆ where 푆푎(푧ˆ) = 푆푝(푧ˆ) = 푠ˆ.
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I now establish that 푧푝 < 푧푎, the minimum wealth level is lower under the new
distribution. Suppose not so that 푧푝 ≥ 푧푎. Then as solutions (푐(푧), 푆(푧)) to the
diﬀerential equation system cannot cross on the (푐, 푆) plane, given our initial condi-
tions that 푐푝(푧푝) = 푧푝 ≥ 푧푎 = 푐푎(푧푎) we have 푐푝 > 푐푎 for a ﬁxed level of 푆. Thus,
given ∂푆 ′/∂푐 < 0 as established above, we would have 푆 ′푝(푧) < 푆
′
푎(푧) at any potential
point of crossing of 푆푎(푧) and 푆푝(푧) (graphed alone as a function of 푧). Since we have
푆푝(푧푝) = 푠푝 < 푠푎 = 푆푎(푧푎), 푆푝 would never in fact cross 푆푎. Thus, the average reward
must be higher ex post than ex ante, which is not possible by assumption. Thus, in
summary, 푆푝(푧) has a strictly larger support than 푆푎(푧), and 푆푝(푧) and 푆푎(푧) are single
crossing, with 푆푝(푧) crossing from below.
But this also implies that the inverses of 푆푝(푧) and 푆푎(푧) are also single crossing.
That is, the two functions 퐺−1푝 (퐻푝(푠)) = 푆
−1
푝 (푠) and 퐺
−1
푎 (퐻푎(푠)) = 푆
−1
푎 (푠) are single
crossing, with 퐺−1푝 (퐻푝(푠ˆ)) = 푧ˆ = 퐺
−1
푎 (퐻푎(푠ˆ)). But if the inverse of the distribution
functions are single-crossing then so are distribution functions 퐺푝(푧) and 퐺푎(푧) with
clearly 퐺푝(푧) > 퐺푎(푧) on (푧푝, 푧ˆ) and 퐺푝(푧) < 퐺푎(푧) on (푧ˆ, 푧¯푝). Single crossing of this
form with an equal mean implies second order stochastic dominance (Wolfstetter, 1999,
Proposition 4.6).
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